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ERISA
Is Employee Retirement Income Really Secure?
Richard D. Furlong
We must realize that the democratic form of
government is bound to penetrate our industrial
life as well. It cannot be confined merely to our
political institutions.
-Sidney Hillman, President
Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union, 1924
Approximately six hundred billion dollars are currently
invested in private pension plans subject to the Employees'
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). By
1995, the figure is expected to approach three trillion
dollars. The assets of these pension funds represent the
largest private pool of capital in the world and, as such, a
new form of wealth. From this fact is derived the preeminent question facing advanced corporate capitalism:
who owns and who will control this new form of economic
power? This article will examine various aspects regarding
the federal regulation of this spectacular form of wealth
through an analysis of the current legal battles and their
relationship to past and predicted trends in pension reform.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PENSION FUND
DEVELOPMENT
Assumptions underlying federal regulation of employee
pension funds, as well as those dictating current judicial
discourse on the subject, are best understood by examining
the historical roots which gave rise to the development of
such funds.
The concept of providing some degree of retirement aid
to employees started to form during the period of huge industrial expansion that followed the Civil War. The American Express Company started a plan in 1875, soon to be followed by plans initiated by the railroads and some of the
giant industrial corporations. These early pension funds
Richard D. Furlong is a J.D. candidate, May 1984, State
University of New York at Buffalo.
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were usually poorly funded and poorly managed, thus mandating outlandish vesting requirements. Then, as now, the
notion of ,pension funds" was particularly appealing to
employers for a number of reasons. First, it allowed
employers to keep employees for long periods of time,
thereby insuring a captive audience pool with all the
attendant benefits of quasi-bound labor. Second, it permitted the squeezing out of older, less productive employees.
Third, in 1926, Congress decreed that employers' contributions to pension plans were tax-deductible, and, as such,
not only were employers given a way to avoid tax on excess
profits, but the net cost to employers was decidely less than
the actual contributions to the plans. Finally, the fact that
these sums could be invested in the company by the fund
managers made the plans even more desirable.
Labor leaders were acutely aware of these benefits
accruing to employers and, by and large, opposed the concept of pension plans as being another means of alienating
the worker from the union while increasing his reliance on
the company. Samuel Gompers argued that labor unions
should shun pension funds in favor of increasing workers'
salaries, which in turn would encourage self-management of
retirement funds. Labor leadership thus perceived pension
funds as a threat to its role within the institutional
framework, and its actions were guided accordingly. This
lack of organized support rendered the push for pension
coverage impotent, and workers were forced to rely on personal savings to carry them through their later years.
However, this attitude of stagnation was reversed by the
onslaught of the Depression and by judicial legitimization of
pension fund bargaining.
The desperation of the working class during the
Depression made it clear to the labor leadership, as well as
to government officials, that some sort of minimum retirement coverage for workers must exist. The benefits provided by the Social Security Act of 1935 were woefully
inadequate, and labor (especially the leadership of the
progressive Congress of Industrial Organization) began to
apply pressure for pension benefits to act as a supplement
to Social Security. The freeze on wages implemented during
World War II did not effect increases in benefits from pension plans (fringe benefits were excluded from the freeze),
which, when coupled with the tax benefits available to
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ERISA
employers, made the funds very attractive to both management and labor. Finally, in 1949, the Supreme Court ruled
in Inland Steel v. N.L.R.B., 336 U.S. 960, that, because
pensions were within the structure of wages as defined by
the Taft-Hartley Act, pension plans fell within the scope of
items upon which management was obligated to bargain.
The coinciding of judicial legitimization with economic
benefits and necessities led to the huge expansion of pension funds during the 1950s and 1960s.
With this huge growth came the simultaneous abuse of
the assets of such funds. Plans were regularly underfunded,
trustees blatantly abused their commonlaw fiduciary
responsibility, and, most damaging, underfunded plans
were routinely terminated resulting in the immediate cessation of all benefits. Congress responded by enacting the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, 29
U.S.C. 301, whose main purpose was to curb abuses by
plan administrators. This legislation had little practical effect on quelling employer and/or trustee abuse of funds,
with the result that at least twenty thousand workers were
annually affected by pension plan failures. In response,
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, which stipulated minimum funding and vesting standards, regulated the actions
of trustees in administering the fund, and insured all guaranteed benefits by the federal government.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PENSION BENEFITS
AS PROPERTY RIGHTS
Historically (as well as in many instances today), employer
"contributions" to pension funds were viewed as a gratuitous bonus which remained the property of the employer
until actually paid out. Since the employee had no legal
right to this property as it was merely a "gift," he/she
could have all or part of the promised benefits taken away
at the whim of the employer. As Paul Harbrecht has pointedly asserted in his book, Pension Funds and Economic
Power:
The early attitude of employers toward pension
plans was that pensions were gifts to their
workers in recognition of long and faithful service and that no legal rights were given to
employees who became beneficiaries of a plan.
Plans at this period were extremely informal,
often consisting of mere statements that the
employer expected to pay certain benefits to
those who performed certain service requirements. In general, the employer did not set up a

Since the employee had no legal
right to this property as it was
merely a "gift," he/she could have
all or part of the promised benefit
taken away at the whim of the
employer.
certain fund to provide pension benefits and the
text of the plan was carefully worded to relieve
him of all liability.
The Supreme Court gave legal credibility to this view
in Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, holding that monies taken
out of a policeman's pay each month and put in a pension
fund were not the property of the policeman and thus no
legal rights attached. The notion that a pension is the
equivalent of a gift is still found in legal decisions today and
is partially responsible for the minimum vesting require,
ments of ERISA.
Gradually, the courts began to concede that employer
"contributions" to pension funds actually represented the
deferred wages of workers. Legal battles over rights to
these deferred wages increasingly were fought in an arena
governed by commonlaw contract rules. As one state court
commented:
The derived benefit to the employer can be
summarized as allowing management flexibility
by assuring an efficient and faithful source of
manpower. The legal consideration flowing
towards the employee is the protection of
future retirement benefits. The net result is
that private pension plans constitute deferred
compensation, which, once vested, bestow
upon the employee a legal right to fruits of his
continued labor. (Luli v. Sun Products Corp, 60
Ohio 2d 144).
Interestingly, the evolution from conceptualizing pen,
sions as deferred wages rather than gratuities, as a practial
matter, did little to improve employee rights to those
benefits. Historical notions of master-servant loyalty obliga,
tions (see above quote) were merged with the contract no,
tions of collective bargaining and this hybrid was applied to
pension payments in the form of vesting requirements. In
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reality, employers retained the legal rights to employees'
property until such time in the future as the vesting requirement is fulfilled. This reversionary right to the
employee's property could be exercised by simply terminating the plan or the job. An example is a recent case, Lovetri

v. Vickers Inc., 397 F. Supp. 293, in which the employees
sought partial compensation of paid contributions after
their plant closed, thereby terminating employment. The
court stated:
Unless a contract provides otherwise, should
it's performance become impossible, the promisee must repay the value of the benefit conferred on him by the partial performance of the
promisor. Defendant, however, did not promise
that plaintiffs would remain in defendant's
employ until retirement thereby becoming entitled to the annuity; it promised the annuity
only if they actually remained employed until
retirement. Plaintiffs in other words were not
paid for their labor with an annuity, but only
with the chance of receiving one should certain
conditions be fulfilled.
Since private property rights confer the right to withhold
from others the enjoyment or use of an object, it is apparent
that vesting requirements effectively placed rights over
employee property in the hands of employers, "deferred
wages" notwithstanding.

OVERVIEW OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT
ERISA represents a congressional response to years of pension fund abuse. Congress had found that, "owing to the
terminations of plans before requisite funds have been
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been
deprived of anticipated benefits." The Act, as amended, is
divided into four titles, each containing several subtitles.
Title I regulates the protection of employee benefit rights
by spelling out the reporting and disclosure requirements
for plans, minimum participation and vesting requirements,
fiduciary responsibilities of fund trustees, and administration and enforcement of the Act. Title 11 amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to conform the code to Title I
specifications. A Joint Pension Task Force is created by
Title I to study the results of the Act and issue periodic
reports to various congressional and administrative bodies.
Title IV is the heart of ERISA as it establishes the Pension
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Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) which federally insures, within certain statuatorily prescribed limits, the payment of nonforfeitable benefits. PBGC collects premiums
from enrolled employers and, in the case of underfunded
plans, has the power to claim up to 30 percent of the net
worth of an employer to help defray the costs of the guaranteed benefits.
ERISA regulates only private defined-benefit plans
and, as such, excludes public as well as defined-contribution plans. A defined-contribution plan is incapable of being underfunded since, by law, a separate account for each
participant must exist and a participant's benefits are measured solely by the level of funds in his/her account. Conversely, in a defined~benefit plan, the level of benefits is set,
with the level of funding to be determined by the employer
subject only to the minimum funding standards set forth in
§302.
Minimum standards notwithstanding, plans became
underfunded for a number of reasons. First, pension funds
are invested heavily in common stocks and thus actual rates
of return are subject to market trends while predicted rates
of return are subject to hyped-up actuarial assumptions. An

ERISA
increase of one percentage point (on"projected return) can
cut the cost of contributions by as much as 25 percent. Second, initial underfunding usually occurs since credit must
be given for past services, although ERISA allows this
credit to be amortized over thirty years for new plans and
forty years for pre-ERISA plans. Third, plans may be
amended by negotiated increases which also may not be
met by current contributions. Fourth, plans with adequate
funding may be merged with a large unfunded plan as a
result of a takeover or merger. The termination of the plan
itself usually occurs due to the firm's filing for bankruptcy, a
total or partial shutdown of the business, or forced termination by the PBGC due to a series of "reportable events"
indicating plan insolvency.
Congress was well aware that setting minimum funding
and vesting requirements would do little to rectify the harm
that would be wrought on workers who would lose their
pension in spite of such standards. As stated earlier, the
most significant aspect of ERISA was the establishment of
the PBGC to insure all nonforfeitable benefits. When a plan
terminates, the employer is required to pay all vested
benefits from the assets of the fund. In the case of unfunded
liabilities, the PBGC is authorized to "provide for the timely and uninterrupted payments of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries." These payments are underwritten in two ways. First, pursuant to §4006(a), the
PBGC is authorized to set and collect premium rates from
plan administrators. Failure to pay premiums may result
in substantial penalties, however the PBGC must continue
to pay guaranteed benefits even if the plan administrator
fails to pay the premiums when due. The second method of
underwriting the insurance program, and upon which the
vast majority of ERISA litigation centers, concerns the
right of the PBGC to seek reimbursement from the
employer for payments made from PBGC funds to cover
nonforfeitable benefits unable to be paid from the pension
fund assets. Congress, no doubt aware of the current state
of underfunding, limited employer liability to the PBGC to
30 percent of the employer's net worth. The problem lies in
the fact that, though the PBGC claim has the "first shot"
effect of a tax lien, the 30 percent figure is miniscule compared to the far greater percentages of unfunded liabilities
due to be paid in the near future. The overriding concern
today is that many companies with huge unfunded liabilities would prefer to pay the 30 percent net asset liability instead of having to fund the much larger pension obligations. This in turn would dump the entire liability in the
lap of the federal government and, given the hundreds of
billions of dollars invested, it is doubtful the government
could make good on its guarantee to insure "deferred

i

wages." Notably, Lloyds of London has refused to under,
write the PBGC since to do so would amount to "insuring
the profitability of the American economy." Further, the
PBGC has recently requested from Congress permission to
hike the premium rates for the third time since 1975. Some
analysts project that what initially started out as a dollar
per participant may soon escalate to forty or fifty dollars per
participant. Tragically, the image of pension fund stability
which ERISA sought to bolster is merely a facade diverting
attention from current trends and their predictably dire
consequences.

CURRENT AREAS OF LITIGATION DEFINING THE
NATURE OF PENSIONS AS PROPERTY RIGHTS
Vesting. In current labor law, it is imperative that critique
not separate form from substance. Hence case law defining
the provisions of ERISA, in particular those relative to
vesting, must be analyzed for their results and how these
results influence current conceptions of the nature of a pen,
sion. Section 203 establishes the minimum vesting stand,
ards. In short, a plan must provide for nonforfeitability of an
employee's right: (1) to his normal retirement benefit upon
attainment of normal retirement age; (2) to his accrued
benefit derived from his own contributions; and (3) to his
accrued benefits derived from employer contributions under
any of three vesting schedules: (a) ten year vesting-100
percent upon completion of ten years of service; (b) five to
fifteen year vesting-25 percent at five years of service, 5
percent for each year five-to-ten, and 10 percent for each
year eleven-to-fifteen; (c) rule of forty-five-50 percent for
an employee who has not separated from service and who
has completed at least five years of service, provided that
the sum of his age and years of service equals or exceeds
forty-five, and 10 percent for each additional year of service
thereafter. Under any of the three schedules for vesting of
accrued benefits derived from employer contributions, no
vesting is required during the first five years of service, at
least 50 percent is required after ten years of service (unless
the 100 percent ten year schedule is adopted), and full
vesting is required after fifteen years of service (under the
five-to-fifteen year schedule), and at age fifty with at least
ten years of service (under the rule of forty-five). Of course,
any plan may provide for earlier vesting.
The majority of plans providing full vesting after ten
years appear fair on their face; however, it is important to
realize how this ten year period serves employer interests.
First, if the employee remains with the same employer for
the full period, the old notion of bound labor is resurrected

L

A

IN THI PUIILIC INTLRLST

I

I

ERISA
to serve the employer. For the employee who has served
seven or eight years, the carrot at the end of the stick is a
strong inducement to remain with the same employer. Further, the fact is that the majority of workers do not remain
with the same employer for the duration of the ten year
period and hence, upon changing jobs, lose all of the deferred wages that have been set aside for them. This is
particularly true of younger workers, and the state of affairs
was summed up by Professor Merton Bernstein when he
remarked, "Unless Congress can do better ...on vesting,
the reform bill will constitute as big a fraud as the plans it
purports to improve" (letter to the New York Times, April
2, 1974). A study appearing in the September 1982 Month,
ly Labor Review indicates that close to 30 percent of all
workers have been on their jobs less than one year and that
the present median job tenure was only slightly more than
three years. In addition, over one-half of the work force
covered by pension funds change jobs well before the ten
year vesting standard imposed by ERISA. Since few companies vest their employees voluntarily before ten years,
the implication is that as a practical matter a pension is not
a deferred wage but a defeatable gratuity subject to the
high mobility of American society.
In Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, the collective bargaining agreement contained a clause limiting benefits upon termination of the plan to the assets in the pension
fund. At the time of termination, the pension fund assets
were sufficient to pay only about 35 percent of the vested
benefits. Section 4022 (a) of Title IV provides that if
benefits are "nonforfeitable" they will be insured by the
PBGC which in turn can seek partial or total indeminification from the employer. The employer argued that, although such benefits were vested, the clause rendered
those benefits forfeitable and thus the PBGC could neither
pay out the benefits nor seek the reimbursement from the
employer. Justice Stevens affirmed the Circuit Court opinion which had reversed the District Court opinion in holding that the terms nonforfeitable and vested are synonymous
and, in spite of such a clause, the accrued benefits were
nonforfeitable as defined within §3 of Title I of ERISA and
thus were insured by the PBGC under Title IV of ERISA.
The court relied on PBGC regulations in determining that
nonfofeitable benefits include all vested benefits and must
be thought of in terms of the quality of a participant's right
to a pension rather than a limit on the amount he may collect. Although apparently closing the door on employer
disclaimer clauses, the court explicitly stated that employer
liability disclaimer provisions are contractually effective to
limit employee-participant's recourse against the employer
when plan assets are insufficient to provide vested benefits.
!
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Nachman upholds the notion of a
vested benefit, yet in a real sense
shifts the responsibilityfor payment
of that benefit from the corporations
to the American taxpayer.
Hence, the court provided employers with a simple legal
drafting problem wherein direct employer liability to employees can be limited in contractual terms by inserting an
appropriate disclaimer clause. With such a clause, employer
liability will never exceed the 30 percent payable to the
PBGC. Given both the instability of the PBGC, coupled
with the huge unfunded liabilities present in many plans,
Nachman upholds the notion of a "vested" benefit; yet, in a
real sense, it shifts the responsibility for payment of that
benefit from the corporation to the American taxpayer.
In part, the lower courts are apparently coming to grips
with the question of who will pay these huge unfunded
liabilities. Clearly, they are bound by common-law notions
of contract and disclaimers of direct responsibility as approved in Nachman; however, in instances where Nachman
could have been construed broadly, the courts have chosen
to apply narrow construction. For instance, in In the Matter
of M&M Transportation Company, 288 Pen. Rept.
(B.N.A.)d-4, the court was faced with a situation in which
a worker who performed service for twenty-one years was
going to be totally denied a pension due to the provisions of
limitation contained in the five year phase-in formula contained in §4022 of ERISA (one of two instances where
PBGC will not insure 100 percent of vested benefits, the
other being the ceiling mark of $1,250). Briefly, §4022
(b)(1), (8) provides that benefits which are created or increased within five years of plan termination are insured
only to the extent of 20 percent per year in which such
benefits were in effect prior to plan termination. The five
year phasein plan was created to protect the reserves of
the PBGC by preventing abuses by employers, because
otherwise there might be temptation to increase benefits irresponsibly. M&M had terminated its plan shortly after
amending it, and the PBGC thereafter refused to pay any
part of the worker's "deferred wage." M&M claimed that
a direct suit by the employee against the employer was
barred by §4062, which provides for employer liability to
the PBGC. The bankruptcy judge held that the employer
was beyond the reach of claims arising from its terminated
I
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pension plan, except to the extent of its liability to the
PBGC. The court reasoned that to allow direct liability
would contravene the desire of Congress not to impose
substantial economic hardships on employers. The District
Court disagreed, reasoning that, where an employer has
substantial assets, he may not substantially underfund the
pension plan and then seek to avoid the obligation to the
employees by shielding himself behind §4062. The court
concluded that, as a matter of policy, ERISA could not
have been intended to absolve an employer of its obligations to pension plan participants. Analyzing the situation
in terms of contract as well as public policy, the court concluded that,
it has been held that the creation of a pension
plan constitutes an offer of unilateral contract
by an employer to his employees. By performing
the conditions of the offer, the employees accept the offer, and a unilateral contract is thereby created.
The employer attempted to show that state contract law
was preempted by ERISA §514; however, the court noted,
"Congress did not intend to render prior law irrelevant
where it fairly accommodates the interests of the parties and is not inconsistent with ERISA's purposes." Without stating it explicitly, the court attempted to provide
several channels for employee redress to obtain otherwise
vested benefits.
In Murphy v. the Heppenstall Company, 635 F2d 233,
the court accomplished the same goal through different
means. Retired employees sued to recover directly from the
employer the difference between the pension payments
guaranteed by PBGC and those negotiated between the
employer and the union. The employer claimed that the
employees' claim grew out of state contract law and that
ERISA pre-empted this, thus negating any claim above and
beyond that payable to the PBGC. Citing Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, the court reasoned that,
since the employees were seeking to enforce a provision of
collectively bargained pension agreement, federal common
law applies. Judge Gibbons found in the legislative history
of ERISA the intent that a body of federal substantive law
will be developed by the Courts to deal with rights and
obligations under private pension plans. Then the court
acknowledged that Nachman allowed employers to place a
contractual limit on their direct liability to employees;
however, in this instance, the failure of such a contractual
limit to be placed rendered the employer liable. By taking
this narrow approach to the Nachman holding, the court

permitted a federal common law contract claim directly
against the employer for the difference between the
payments due, under the pension plan as guaranteed by the
PBGC, and payments due directly from the employer
under the collectively bargained pension agreement.
The courts in both M&M Transportationand Heppen,
stall reached the same result yet utilized different methods
to do so. The former dealt with a situation in which there
was no union (that is, collectively bargained agreement)
and therefore had to rely upon a merger of state contract
law remedies with the public policy underlying ERISA.
The latter was dealing with a collectively bargained agree,
ment and could thereby sidestep §514 of ERISA (pre,
emption) by mobilizing §301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
(authorizing creation of federal commonlaw of labor
management contracts).
As both these cases are indicative of the lower court
reaction to Nachman, one wonders why the lower courts
are attempting to circumvent Nachman by reading it nar,
rowly. This writer asserts that the lower courts are becom,
ing increasingly afraid of the huge amounts of unfunded
liabilities that will be coming due shortly and, by allowing
direct contractual suits, are attempting to instill some
degree of responsibility in employers to make adequate
payments to the funds. If there is an unfunded liability, the
question is not whether or not someone will take a loss but
rather who will take the loss. As stated earlier, pensions
are an integral part of the institutional system comprising
corporate capitalism and as such can survive only if workers
have faith in the viability of the funds. Similar to the
FDIC, the PBGC was established to instill some degree of
faith in the system; however, it is clear that neither in,
surance program could make good on its promises in the
event of a catastrophic collapse of the economic system.
The legitimization of pensions within the institutional
framework is decidely dependent upon the confidence of
those whose "deferred wages" constitute the system. The
lower courts are aware of this and, when possible, have
tailored their decisions accordingly.
Deferred wages. If "deferred wages" are to have any
meaning, the courts must face the question of who will con,
trol the allocation and investment of such funds which
rightfully belong to the workers. Perhaps the most significant case to address this issue directly is Daniel v. Inter,
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse,
men, and Helpers of America, 439 U.S. 551. Daniel, a union
member, brought an action alleging that the trustees and
union had misrepresented and omitted to state material
facts with respect to the value of his interest in the pension
plan and were therefore guilty of securities fraud. The Cir,
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cuit Court of Appeals, 561 F2d 1223 (7th Circuit), agreed
with the District Court, 410 F. Supp. 541, that plaintiff
Daniel had made an investment decision by agreeing to
work for a certain employer who maintained a pension plan.
The court held that since the union pension fund was invested for a common enterprise, had its management committed to a third party other than the union members, and
was reasonably expected to produce profits and income, the
accepting of employment was an "investment contract" and
hence a "security" for the purposes of the Security Acts of
1933 and 1934. The court also noted that the employee
was the true contributor to the pension fund since there
was a disposition for value-namely, that a proportion of
the employees overall wages were contributed
to the fund (deferred wages).
The decision and its implications had strong reaction
throughout Wall Street and union offices across the country. In effect, the 7th Circuit was creating a huge new propertied class based on the notion of deferred wages. If interest in a pension fund was a security, pension beneficiaries
could use pension funds as collateral for home mortgages or
higher education loans or any number of investments which
now are inaccessible to the average worker. Naturally,
there are huge implications when fifty million working and
retired Americans have the right to exercise control over
hundreds of billions of dollars in pension assets. Paul Harbrecht succinctly defines the issues by stating:
great social advantages may be derived from
treating pension funds as property of the pensioners. A property interest in the pension fund
would return to the worker some of the economic independence which the pension system
has taken from him. As acknowledged owners,
employees would be given some share in the
direction and control of pension funds. This
would mean that they would have some voice
in the investment of these assets. A voice in
the investment policy would allow the employees to help direct fund investment into channels
beneficial to them, such as housing and savings
and loan activities. [Pension Funds and Economic Power, 19591
On appeal to the Supreme Court, industry groups-the
American Bankers Association, the Department of Labor,
and, not surprisingly, labor unions-all filed amicus briefs
urging a reversal of the Circuit Court claiming that application of the Security Laws to pension funds would mean that
millions of deprived pensions will bring suits demanding
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pensions are an integralpart of

the institutionalsystem comprising
corporate capitalism and as such

can only survive if workers have
faith in the viability of the funds.
billions of dollars in pension funds they never received. In a
seven-to-zero decision (Stevens absent), the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court by holding that the employees'
decision to accept or reject employment had little to do
with perceived investment possibilities of the future pension but was instead based on the immediate ability to earn
a livelihood. The court concluded that "itignores the economic realities to equate employer contributions with an
investment by the employee."
Underlying the Court's holding are the assumptions
that (1) employees are too ignorant to realize the investment possibilities of placing payments in a pension fund; (2)
control of assets must remain in the hands of third partiesthat is, employee rights must still be framed in reference to
gratuities and not deferred wages; (3) because employees
make no "investment" in the pension fund they can acquire
no stake in the direction of their assets nor any interest in
the fruits of their labor. The Court's assumptions undermine worker control over this new form of derivative property so that control over their own labor (strike) is still the
only recognized power labor manifests. Ironically, most collective bargaining agreements contain "nostrike" clauses
thus removing even this weapon from labor's arsenal.
In examining the question of what is the property
nature of a pension asset, it is helpful to examine those
cases in which there exists an excess of plan assets upon
termination of the plan. Naturally, the question in these
cases is over distribution of residual assets. Section 403
(c)(1) provides that assets of an employee benefit plan are
to be held for the exclusive benefit of the plan participants
while Section 403 (c)(A) allows return of employer "'contributions" if the contribution was made by reason of mistake
of fact. Under §4044 (d)(1), three conditions must exist for
residual assets to be distributed to the employer: (1) all liabilities must be satisfied; (2) the distribution is not in contravention of any law; (3) the plan provides for such a
distribution in these circumstances. To date, the litigation
has centered around the third condition-that is, what constitutes a legally sufficient reversion clause.
Two analytically distinct categories of cases have so far
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been litigated. The first involves "impossibility of amendment" restriction, meaning that the plan contains a clause
stating that plan assets shall never revert to the employer.
The PBGC has taken the position that the plan cannot at
any time thereafter be amended to include an otherwise
permissible reversion provision. However, in In Re C. D.
Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 107 F. Supp. 1128, the only fully
litigated case on this issue, the court permitted a reversion
of excess assets totaling $90,000 to the employer on the
premise "that the parties did not contemplate that at the
time of termination there would be an excess due to overfunding." The court emphasized that:
employees will continue to be protected to the
extent of their specific benefits, but will not
receive any windfalls due to the employer's
mistake in predicting the amount necessary to
keep the plan on sound financial basis.
Interestingly, the court implicitly views the employer contributions as gratuities because there is no logical reason
why employee property which earns more profits than predicted should revert to an employer. The only justification
for such a reversion must be that the employer retains a certain property interest in payments. One wonders what
rationale exists in a system which allows employers to shift
huge unfunded liabilities onto the back of the PBGC while
allowing "mistake of fact" overfunding to accrue to the
benefit of the employer.
The second type of case in this area is known as "the
appropriate time for amendment" case. Since ERISA requires that any reversionary interest be specifically spelled
out in the plan, employers often attempt to add amendments at termination or posttermination to provide for the
reversion of what appear to be excess assets. In Audio
Fidelity Corp. v. PBGC, 624 F2d 513, there existed a plan
which specifically provided for the distribution of excess
assets to employees. Seven months after the termination,
the employer amended the plan retroactive to the date of
termination to provide for a reversion of residual assets
to the employer. The District Court (No. 78-0623R.E.D.Va.) held that the excess profits were made by
mistake of fact and, because there was no indication that
the amendment upset the benefit expectations of the
participants, any distribution of funds to them would be unjust enrichment. The fallacies of the reasoning in In Re C.
D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund are appliable to this decision. On
appeal, the 4th Circuit reversed, holding that the amendment was ineffective since it was post-termination and the
rights of all parties became fixed on the date of termination.
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More importantly, the court rejected the unjust enrichment
argument on the basis that the income was derived from
payments for services rendered by employees rather than
from gratuities.
Courts in different circuits and districts are generally
divided in their approach to property claims on excess
assets. These cases demonstrate that the concept of a pen,
sion as a deferred wage is far from being universally ac,
cepted. Although it might be argued that terming and con,
ceptualizing a pension as a deferred wage versus a gratuity
is nothing more than a matter of semantics, in actuality the
stakes are much higher. The battle to determine who shall
control the investment of pension funds and therefore
determine the future of the U.S. economy is dependent
upon how workers, unions, and jurists frame such property
notions.
To reiterate, ERISA is an institutional attempt to add
stability to what is readily conceded to be very unstable
economic transactions. The roots of pension legislation are
derived from prior notions regarding worker loyalty to
employers (vesting); however, statistical analysis of
present-day worker mobility does not comport with the
professed motivation behind the vesting provisions. As a
result, fewer than 45 percent of all covered participants will
collect a pension, even under ERISA. Also, case law indi,
cates that the right to consider the pension of a worker as
earned (deferred wage) and hence an investment growing
out of labor is virtually nonexistent. Certain lower courts
are coming to grips with the future disastrous consequences
of present-day unfunded liabilities and are rendering deci,
sions which they hope will instill responsibility in plan
payers. In short, judicial patchwork is attempting to fill the
gapping holes permeating ERISA. What is truly needed is
comprehensive legislation providing for immediate vesting
of all accrued benefits, possibly in the form of liberal porta,
bility provision, thereby rendering Danieltype issues and
excess asset issues moot. Since there can be no legitimi,
zation of form where the substance is unequal, the forin
must be re-conceptualized and then re-written.
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